Burma Road
MARS TASK FORCE
A SHORT HISTORY
By Ralph E. Baird
The 5332d Brigade (Prov) was activated on 26 July 1944.
It soon came to be known as MARS TASK FORCE. It was designed as a Long Range
Penetration Force and training, equipment and organization were all directed
toward this end. The following narrative report is submitted. Staff and unit
histories, and technical reports are submitted under separate cover.
MARS was able to profit by the experience of
Wingate’s Raiders and Merrill’s Marauders in Burma jungle operations. The
leaven of veteran jungle fighters was mixed with the freshness of volunteers and
the assignment of the 124th Cavalry Regiment. A triangular plan was
envisioned and in many ways Mars Task Force was truly a Division, consisting of
the 475th Infantry, 124th Cavalry (Sp.) and 1st Chinese Regiment.
The Cavalry Regiment had a long history of mounted
Cavalry and was converted by Mars to Cavalry dismounted, with the functions and
employment of an Infantry Regiment. The 475th Infantry was organized by Mars and
given official status as a numbered Infantry Regiment by the War Dept. The
Brigade itself was organized as a Provisional Unit.
At no time was Brigade permitted to employ the 1st
Chinese Regiment, Sep in any tactical operations. To have been able to use this
regiment would have increased the striking power of the Brigade considerably.
Although the NAMHPAKKA-HOSI Campaign is considered highly successful, another
regiment would have permitted the use of either the 475th Infantry or the 124th
Cavalry to swing southward or eastward in a Brigade encroachment of the enemy.
It was impossible to do so under the circumstances, for to use one or two
Battalion Combat Teams for this purpose would have jeopardized not only such a
small striking force but also the holding force. The series of commanding
terrain features were such that they had been left open by any Battalion Combat
Team it would have been an open invitation to the Japs to surround and destroy
the Brigade piecemeal. The 1st Chinese Regiment, later attached to the 50th
Division, and committed, demonstrated its ability, and climaxed its campaign by
securing KYAUKME and linking with the 36th Division (British). This closed an
East-West line. MONG YAI-HSIPAW-KYAUKME-MONGLONG-MOGOK. The British were thus
placed in a position to join with the forces of the 14th Army, to establish the
line. MONG YAI-HSIPAW-KYAUKME-MAMYO-MANDA-LAY, to terminate the conquest of
Northern and North Central Burma.
The Brigade component committed in the TONKWA-MO HLAING
sector (475th Infantry) broke Jap opposition in that area and permitted the 50th
Division to move in and occupy the area, thence to move Southward to play its
part in establishing the line mentioned above.
Upon completion of the action at TONKWA, the Brigade
turned to the East and thrust deep into enemy territory to strike the
Namhkam-Lashio Burma Road axis, at NAMHPAKKA. The swiftness of movement gained
surprise, and the viciousness of attack removed the keystone of the sector. The
blow inflicted by Mars at this point caused the enemy to withdraw rapidly below
LASHIO and allowed the New First Army (Chinese) to move almost unopposed south
of LASHIO, screening against counter-attack and forcing the enemy a safe
distance from the STILWELL Road. Brigade was held in the NAMHPAKKA area to be
passed through by New First Army. Hence, Mars could not further exploit its own
successes. Here contact was broken, and friendly forces belatedly grasped the
advantage gained, fulfilling its order in a virtual road march.
The training period of Mars as a Brigade was unusually
short. One year is considered the normal training period for a division.
Further, all of the Brigade Infantry units, as noticed before, had to be
organized (475th Infantry) or converted (124th Cavalry, 1st Chinese Regiment,
Sept.)
Throughout tactical operations, the 612th FA Bn (Pk)
and the 613th FA Bn (Pk) acquitted themselves with distinction. This was
accomplished with the sole aid of 75mm Pack Artillery, constantly opposed by
much heavier and longer range enemy weapons (105 and 150mm). The basic intention
of Field Artillery - to displace enemy artillery from hostile fire positions
against our forces - could not be accomplished by range and striking power.
However, in the long run, this was satisfactorily accomplished by attrition and
by slow but effective destruction of enemy armament and materiel, as well as by
disorganization and damage to motor parks, fuel dumps, warehouses and CP’s
(brought within range by the selection of objective). Inability to force earlier
displacement of enemy artillery resulted in numerous Brigade casualties.
To reach Brigade objectives, many difficulties
previously believed to be well nigh impossible were overcome. That men, mules
and fighting equipment can be moved during the monsoons over mountainous Burma
jungle trails was indicated.
Three days of torrential rain, known as the
Christmas monsoons, came during this movement. Trails became running streams of
water; narrow paths lacing the edges of the mountain ranges became slippery
deathtraps. Necessarily, some mule loads were thrown and animals plunged
headlong off trails, but approximately 3000 mules and 7000 men performed the
entire movement with the loss of no more than three mule loads. Often mules were
hoisted by rope and the load recovered in the same manner. It is a signal
tribute the mule leaders who so successfully nursed their hardy charges through
these difficulties. Although previous training of the mules had been along
herding principles, the Brigade system of a mule leader to each mule paid rich
dividends. Perimeter defense was securely established each night and wide
reconnaissance patrols kept active.
In the movement from NANSIN to NAMHPAKKA, topography
was unfavorable. Forbidding ranges were traversed. Above the SCHWELI RIVER these
were sometimes so exhausting as to permit only one or two minutes of moving,
followed by five minutes of rest. Terrain permitted, for example, one day’s
move of only 3-1/2 miles. A reasonable time table was nonetheless maintained.
Despite hardships, upon arrival of the objective the Brigade attacked without
delay with high combat efficiency.
Although the popular picture of BURMA warfare is
portrayed by steaming jungles, elevations as great as 8000 feet were surmounted.
On three successive days of fair weather, water froze in canteens and helmets.
These extremes in climate did not result in illness to the troops, even though
but one blanket and poncho per man constituted the entire bedding. Fires were
out of the question for wandering groups of Japs were always a threat.
Mules survived almost 100% and arrived in excellent
condition. As distance traveled increased, the ratio of soldier march fractures
went up. Men who otherwise would have remained effective under shorter overall
distance, found their metatarsal arches breaking down and a high percentage of
such casualties had to be evacuated.
At times evacuation difficulties were a cause of deep
concern to the entire command. Air Liaison could not function. No motor roads
were available. Natives had vanished, were unemployable, or were felt
untrustworthy for this work. Animals were prime loaded with loads and also
unsuitable for evacuation. The line of communications was vulnerable to ambush,
and blockade by the enemy. It was necessary to withhold a Rifle Company to
escort and carry through evacuees for a period of four days. Evacuation at this
time was to MONGWI where a Liaison plane strip served evacuation to the rear.
Hemmed in as this strip was by rough mountains, the burden of evacuation was
heavy. On several occasions, evacuation parties were able to come within one
mile of this strip and unable to reach it before nightfall. It is considered a
benevolent stroke of good fortune that evacuees were brought in without
exception.
When ordered out for a conference, the CG, 532nd
Brigade (Prov) covered in a forced mule back ride of one day, the distance
traveled by the foot elements in three days marching. Traveling mounted with a
single companion reduced the number of obstacles that confronted mass movement.
Although one blanket and poncho provided the only
protection against bitterly cold nights, substantial weight was thereby added to
the individual pack. No instances of pack paralysis occurred. However, the
weight is considered a contributing factor to march fractures. To accomplish
Long Range Penetration, it was necessary for each man to carry essential items.
These were stripped to the minimal by such measures as having each individual
carry a spoon, and the top of the meat can, in some instances only a spoon and
canteen cup. Two canteens were necessary for all water had to be boiled or
treated before consumption. Rations, jungle kit, machete, jungle knife,
individual weapons and ammunition had to be man carried as well as shoes,
clothing and toilet articles. Compasses were carried by all. Mule loads, such as
guns and signal equipment sometimes amounted to 350 pounds. Green fatigues and
combat boots, or GI shoes with leggings proved satisfactory as a jungle uniform.
Jungle boots were generally used for relief. Helmets were worn except in certain
night patrolling.
Throughout the movements, air drop was the only source
of rations and other resupply. No more than three days rations could be carried.
The country seldom offered fair air drop sites, and frequently a high percentage
of the drops was impossible to recover in precipitous wooded areas.
To accomplish the Brigade mission of cutting the Burma
Road at NAMHPAKKA, it was necessary to seize extensive battalion objectives. The
controlling features were independent broad hills and high ranges. To leave one
unoccupied was to leave the enemy in a commanding position. LOI KANG Ridge, for
example, extended approximately two miles in length. rising between the long
valley on the west and open stretch of the Burma Road on the east. No cover or
defiles existed on this sector of the Burma Road. The Japs were well entrenched
on LOI KANG Ridge and held two villages (LOI KANG and MAN SAK) which nestled
high in its wooded recesses. Only surprise and a quickly prosecuted attack by
the second battalion upon its reaches could have ousted the enemy. The attack
had to be made up sheer walls and base tactics of fire and movement wrenched
this ground from enemy hands. Gaining the northern crest it was necessary for
this battalion to turn south and fight down the axis of the range, yard by yard
drawing the enemy back until another battalion (1st Bn. 475th Inf.) had seized
its objectives and organized the ground. This battalion then executed a limited
encirclement of the LOI KANG enemy forces. Thereafter, the 2nd Battalion was
secure upon the ridge, enemy forces having been killed or forced to decamp. A
trail along the only passage this range had 80 individual pillboxes in a
100-yard area that had to be cleaned out. Continuous enemy counter-attacks was
pressed. The 1st Battalion had to be withdrawn immediately after its
participation in this attack to protect the hill features it had secured to the
west of LOI KANG Ridge.
During this operation each Bn combat Team had its hands
full with its respective objective, all being high ground features commanding
the road. Continuously, however, ambushes, combat patrols, roadblocks, automatic
weapons, fires, mines and artillery were used on the road by all battalions and
squadrons. Even before the heights were fully taken, the enemy situation had
become such that in his withdrawal from the north he had to cease all day
movement over the road; soon all night movement. The equipment and troops he was
able to extricate from the north had to go over the network of roads previously
constructed well east of the Burma Road and out of range of MARS fire power.
Many of his wounded, and perhaps many of his dead, were taken southward toward
LASHIO through the corridors east of the Burma Road.
Disregarding enemy numbers not confirmed as killed, a
ratio of six and one half Japs to one American was established.
During these operations, the only equipment to fall
into enemy hands was one small radio set. It is possible, but not confirmed,
that one American prisoner was taken. One 75mm piece suffered a direct hit and
three others were damaged, but replacement parts put these guns in action on the
succeeding day.
Both air drop supply of all classes and Liaison plane
evacuation of the wounded were under enemy fire throughout this campaign. Air
currents were treacherous and inadequate Liaison strips were all that could be
devised.
Little malaria existed, except recurrences of earlier
contraction. Precautions against typhus and dysentery; as well as malaria, were
constantly impressed, but some inevitably was suffered. Only one latent neurosis
developed.
Mules were controllable in proximity to hostile and
friendly fire. Bamboo cutting made nutritious provender when the tactical
situation prevented loose grazing.
During the campaign MARS introduced to combat use, the
night sighting devices known as Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes. These were
received in the midst of operations and hasty acquaintance with the instruments
was all that could be had. Tactics were established for the use of these on the
ground.
At the conclusion of this campaign, MARS was a
well-knit and experienced force, all elements having undergone combat, new
techniques devised, lessons learned, morale high, leadership seasoned.
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