Burma Road
612TH FIELD ARTILLERY BN. (PACK)
North and Central Burma
Campaigns
November 18, 1944 to April 18,
1945
On the morning of November 17, 1944, under the command
of Lt. Col. Severn T. Wallis, the 612th Field Artillery Battalion marched from
Camp Landis, near Myitkyina, Burma on its first combat mission. Attached to the
475th Infantry Regiment it constituted the artillery element of one of the two
Combat Teams which together formed the 5332nd Brigade, known as the Mars Task
Force.
From November 17 to 26, the march led generally
southward to Tali, a distance of 95 miles. At Tali, a battery was detached from
the battalion and with the 1st Battalion of the 475th Infantry struck for Swegu
to the southwest on a separate combat mission. Following three days rest during
which supplies were received by "air drop", the battalion again
proceeded southward a distance of 98 miles, arrived December 9th in the vicinity
of Tonkwa and the Nansin airstrip. This march was conducted primarily during
hours of darkness, the column at one time passing within a few miles of Japanese
forces which had escaped during the last days of Bhamo. No contact was made,
however.
At Tonkwa, on December 10th, contact was made in force
between the 2nd Battalion of the 475th Infantry and a Regiment of the once famed
Japanese 18th Division. The 2nd Battalion deployed into a perimeter extending
both north and south of the Tonkwa River. "B" Battery moved within
this perimeter, went into position on the north bank of the river and furnished
approximately 40 of its men to man a sector of 300 yards between "F"
and "G" Companies. The next day its guns were the first organic
American Artillery Battery to bring its fire upon the enemy in Burma. Meanwhile,
"C" Battery with the 3rd Battalion established a perimeter
approximately 1200 yards to the north near Ma-Hlsang. Its fire was used in
direct support of the 2nd Battalion perimeter.
Between December 12 and 24th, "B" and
"C" Batteries gave direct support to patrolling actions undertaken by
the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, fired on targets of opportunity, undertook harassing
and interdiction missions and conducted counter-battery. In all, approximately
2500 were fired by the two batteries. Observation by the two battalion liaison
planes and by the forward observers was very successful and considerable
casualties, verified by later advances, were inflicted on the enemy. The
Japanese employed four 75mm guns using numerous single positions, and although
they succeeded in placing numerous rounds within the battalion’s gun positions
and mule parks, casualties were extremely light. One man died of wounds received
and two were less seriously injured.
On December 24th, the 3rd Battalion moved forward and
occupied new positions in readiness for attack. "C" Battery likewise
displaced forward. However, contact with the enemy was lost, their forces
apparently retreating southward and the day after Christmas the American forces
deployed around Tonkwa were relieved by units of the 50th Chinese Division.
The action at Tonkwa enabled the 22nd Chinese Division
to be safely flown from the airstrip at Nansin without fear of harassment by the
considerable enemy forces deployed in that vicinity.
On December 28th, "A" Battery together with
the 1st Battalion rejoined the 475th Combat Team, and on January 1, 1945, the
612th Battalion moved out to embark with the other elements of Mars Task Force
upon its second combat mission - to cut the Burma road north of Lashio and so
isolate the Japanese forces falling back before the 30th and 38th Divisions in
the valley near Namkham.
The first leg of the arduous march from Tonkwa to the
Burma Road led eastward to Mong-Wi, a distance of approximately 53 miles over
rugged mountainous terrain cut by swift-flowing mountain streams. The trail was
narrow and generally difficult. On the 3td and 4th, the Shweli River was
successfully crossed and on January 8th, the battalion reached Mong-Wi. Supply
on this march was entirely by "air drop", the only communication with
Rear Echelon being by radio. At Mong-Wi, the battalion rested in bivouac and
received by air some replacement of clothing and equipment. The march was
continued on January 14th, "B" Battery being detached and marching in
serial with the 2nd Battalion. Proceeding eastward, the terrain became
increasingly difficult, the narrow tortuous trails ascending and falling
thousands of feet within a distance of a few miles. At several points, a height
of 6700 feet was reached. Rain fell intermittently, rendering the trail almost
impassable. Even though steps were cut in the mud, and alternate routes hacked
from the jungle, many mules fell with their loads into the deep ravines. In
order to arrive at the Line of Departure on D-Day, January 17th, the
battalion on January 16 and 17 marched 36 hours with only one two-hour halt.
Much of this march was undertaken along the beds of rock-bottomed streams, the
men and mules often chest deep in water for several hours.
The immediate objectives of the 475th Infantry Combat
Team included three hills grouped around the Hosi Valley and overlooking the
Burma Road at approximately the 76-mile marker (midway between Namkham and
Lashio). On January 17th, "A" Battery went into position on Nawkham
Ridge, approximately 5500 yards from the Burma Road and was the first battery to
open fire on Japanese motor traffic on the road. "C" Battery occupied
position nearby and also opened fire on the 17th. Both batteries together with
Battalion Headquarters were within the perimeter of the 1st Battalion which had
taken its objective, Nawkham Ridge, during the afternoon, meeting light
opposition and sustaining light casualties.
On the night of January 18th, "B" Battery
made a rapid occupation of position in darkness and under fire in the valley,
the 2nd Battalion having met heavy opposition and having failed to take its
objective, Loi-Kang Ridge, in the afternoon. The next morning, "B"
Battery likewise opened fire. Its position was adjacent to the "drop"
and liaison fields which were receiving intensive artillery and mortar fire from
the enemy. In spite of harassment from this fire and from
"free-dropped" grain bags, its guns were able to fire missions
successfully.
It may now be revealed that had the 475th Combat Team
failed to secure the Hosi Valley on D-Day for use in receiving supplies by air
it could not have sustained itself. Rations were exhausted on the evening of the
17th and ammunition supplies were very limited, there being no ground supply
route to the rear.
To the north, the 124th Cavalry Regiment with the 613th
Field Artillery Battalion jumped off against similar objectives near the Burma
Road and by January 20th all units of the Mars Task Force had been committed;
none were held in reserve.
By D plus 3, the 2nd Battalion had secured the northern
tip of Loi-Kang Ridge, the remainder and highest slopes of the ridge and its
three villages still being occupied by strongly entrenched Japanese forces.
Nevertheless, in order to fire directly upon the Burma Road, "B"
Battery was moved from the valley to the ridge and within the 2nd Battalion’s
perimeter, it being assigned a sector between "E" and Headquarters
Companies. From this position, the road was at one point merely 1700 yards away
and direct fire was possible. The gun position was, however, in plain view of
the enemy from the road and from the hills to the west as well as being within
300 yards of their perimeter on the ridge. On the 24th, "A" Battery
moved its position on Nawkham Ridge and "B" Battery retired from Loi-Kang
Ridge to occupy the position thus vacated. The battalion was now concentrated
within an area of less than 1000 yards and for the first time was brought under
centralized control.
From January 24 through February 5, all three firing
batteries and Headquarters received intensive and very accurate fire from well
camouflaged and defiladed Japanese artillery in position along the Burma Road to
the north. In spite of frequent changes in position, the firing batteries
received again and again direct hits in their gun positions. According to
Brigade Intelligence reports it is believed that three 150mm Howitzers, eight
75mm guns and numerous 70mm field pieces were employed by the enemy in an effort
to neutralize our fire. By February 5, the 612th and 613th Battalions assisted
by the 10th Air Force P-47’s had forced cessation of all enemy artillery
action. During this period, however, the battalion took rather heavy casualties;
four men were killed and 46 wounded. In all, nine of the battalions’ 12
Howitzers were rendered unfit to fire by direct hits or near misses. These were
quickly replaced by "air drop" and consequently at no time did the
battalion have fewer than seven guns in action. "A" and "B"
Batteries received direct hits in their ammunition pits and only through the
gallant action of their gun crews in extinguishing the resulting fires were very
serious casualties averted. During this period of almost three weeks, the
battalion through air, forward and OP observation fired approximately 9500
rounds, the missions undertaken by the battalion as a whole and by its batteries
separately included close support of combat patrols deployed from the battalions
of the 475th and accompanied by artillery forward observers, interdiction and
harassing fire of the Burma Road (numerous enemy trucks and several tanks were
destroyed by direct hits) and direct support of the infantry in attack. During
the final attack on Lio-Kang by the 1st and 2nd Battalions on February 3, the
battalion fired in preparation more than 2000 rounds, laying down the barrage
within 75 yards of the advancing infantry. The last enemy fire was received on
February 5 and on the 6th the Battle of Hosi Valley was successfully concluded.
On that day, elements of the Chinese First Army including medium and light tanks
were in sight on the Burma Road and the Mars task force was considered to have
been relieved.
Throughout the battle, the Air Corps lent direct
support with strafing and dive bombing while the 5th and 115th Liaison Squadrons
evacuated from the valley more than 700 casualties, their planes being subjected
to enemy fire both on the "strip" and in the air. Nine of their planes
were destroyed by artillery and mortar fire.
A "rest bivouac" was established in the
valley on February 8, the battalion using parachutes from the "drop
field" in the construction of tents. On the 11th, Lt. Gen. Dan I. Sultan
arrived by air, commended the 612th Field Artillery Battalion for its part in
the battle and presented decorations. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten likewise
arrived by plane and spoke informally to the troops, praising highly their part
in the re-opening of the Ledo-Burma Road to China.
On March 5, the 612th together with other elements of
Mars Task Force began the long march southward along the Burma Road to Lashio.
The intense heat and humidity of early spring and the hard surface of the road
rendered this march grueling and exhausting even though it was conducted for the
most part during hours of darkness. Hsai-Hkao was reached on March 6, camp being
made there until the 23rd when the march was resumed. A semi-permanent bivouac
was finally established at Ina-Lang, near Lashio, on March 25, the fall of this
city bringing to a close the employment of American troops in Burma. On April 3,
"B" Battery was flown to Kunming, China, and on the 18th the remainder
of the battalion followed.
Combat Statistics
Days engaged in combat mission 152
Days in actual contact with enemy ad under fire 36
Rounds of ammunition fired against the enemy 12,000
Distance covered on combat missions 412
Killed in action 5
Wounded in action 48
Evacuated for illness and disease 46
Decorations:
Purple Heart 48
Air Medal 3
Bronze Star 4
Soldier’s Medal 1
The information and statistics included in
this history are based on the Unit History, the Unit Journal and various
personal diaries and journals kept by the officers of the battalion.
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